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Abstract. We introduce a novel framework that provides a logical struc-
ture for classifying and organizing fundamental components and concepts
of location privacy. Our framework models mobile networks and appli-
cations, threats, location-privacy preserving mechanisms, and metrics.
We demonstrate the relevance of our framework by showing how the
existing proposals in the field of location privacy are embodied appro-
priately in the framework. Our framework provides “the big picture” of
research on location privacy and hence aims at paving the way for future
research. It helps researchers to better understand this field of research,
identify open problems, appropriately design new schemes, and position
their work with respect to other efforts. The terminology proposed in
this framework also facilitates establishing an inter-disciplinary research
community on location privacy.
1 Introduction
Location-based services are becoming ubiquitous, fueled by the generalization of
mobile devices, notably smart phones. There also exist numerous applications
that take advantage of the latest capabilities of mobile devices, in order to share
information between users in a wireless peer-to-peer manner [1–3], or to exchange
location-based information with service providers [4, 5, 17, 20, 46, 62].
Despite the popularity of these services, privacy issues such as the undesired
leakage of users’ location information to location-based service operators, or to
external eavesdroppers is a major concern. In this paper, we are concerned with
location privacy that, according to Duckham and Kulik [27], is defined as a
special type of information privacy which concerns the claim of individuals to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent location information
about them is communicated to others.
The problem of protecting the location privacy of mobile users has attracted
researchers from various backgrounds. Hence, the problem has been approached
from different angles and various countermeasures for different threats have been
proposed. Notwithstanding all valuable existing efforts, there is no unified un-
derstanding of the problem, the adversary model and location-privacy metrics.
Without a systematic identification of the possible threats, specification of
available countermeasures, and design of appropriate evaluation metrics, there
is no guarantee that the location privacy of users can be actually protected
2in different scenarios. In particular, the adversary’s knowledge, her available
technologies, access rights, potential actions, and her goals should be formalized
in order to enable the design of effective countermeasures. The metrics used
for measuring location privacy should be carefully designed in order to reflect
the users’ actual gain in employing a location-privacy preserving mechanism, by
considering the users’ privacy requirements and the adversary’s knowledge.
Due to these considerations, we construct a unified framework for location
privacy in which the different components that affect location privacy are defined
and their interrelations are identified. A consistent structure and terminology,
proposed in this framework, allows us to better understand existing efforts and
thus position them appropriately in the field of location-privacy research. We
provide a thorough study of previous works and place each of them appropriately
in our framework, based on the role it plays in protecting location privacy. The
framework, further, paves the way for future research in this field, by introducing
a common notion for location privacy. It will help identifying the shortcomings
of the existing approaches and discovering neglected aspects; hence, identifying
open problems of location privacy. The proposed terminology can also help uni-
fying current diverse efforts in the location-privacy field of research and structure
the work of the community. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
that takes the many aspects of location privacy into account, clarifies their inter-
relation, and proposes a unified framework in which the existing achievements
are embodied.
In our framework, we introduce the various components of location privacy
following the flow of information from the users to the adversary. A location-
privacy preserving mechanism acts as a noisy channel that modifies the informa-
tion that is communicated from the users (as the source of information) to the
adversary (as the observer/receiver). Users’ location privacy is maximized if the
adversary cannot correctly link their location and identity over time. In other
words, using the information she obtains by observing users’ activities from be-
hind the curtain of privacy preserving mechanisms, the more distorted is users’
location in the adversary’s eyes, the higher their location privacy is.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we model mobile net-
works and formalize the users’ spatiotemporal information. In Section 3, we
model the users’ location traces after being distorted by location-privacy pre-
serving mechanisms. In Sections 4 and 5, we provide an elaborate model for
the adversary, different categories of location privacy, the methodology for mea-
suring location privacy, and an exhaustive study of existing metrics. Finally, in
Section 6, we survey the existing models in the literature, before concluding the
paper in Section 7.
2 Mobile Networks
A mobile wireless network consists of a set of mobile users equipped with wireless
devices that are capable of establishing ad hoc communication among themselves
and/or connecting to infrastructures (e.g., cellular networks, and WiFi access
3points) in order to use a common service using the appropriate application.
There exist many applications that can help users to access the provided services
in mobile networks. Location-based services, mobile social networking, mobile
recommender systems, friend finder services, people-centric sensing systems, and
ad hoc networking are some examples of the services provided in mobile networks.
Users can employ a wide range of applications in mobile networks. These
applications can be categorized into subsets based on their different features.
Because our focus is on how users’ location can be used by an application, we
divide the applications into two dimensions: automatic vs. manual , based on
the way information is shared by the application; continuous vs. discrete, based
on the time distribution of information sharing. As an example, people-centric
sensing applications, where users upload information about their environment
to a central server, are automatic and continuous. Electronic ticketing, which is
used in public transportation systems, is automatic and discrete. Some of the
applications such as location-based services encompass a variety of applications,
each of which has different features. However, most of the popular location-based
services are manual and discrete.
2.1 Users
We denote by U the set of users who are members of the mobile network. Depend-
ing on the provided service, users might also belong to online social networks.
We assume that each and every user is associated with two distinct types of
identities: A real identity and a set of pseudonyms.
The real identity of a user is any subset of his attributes (e.g., name, national
identity number, and private key) that uniquely identifies the user within the
set of users U [61]. The real identity of each user is unique and invariant over
time. Let I denote the set of real identities associated with all users. There is
a bijective relation between a user and his real identity. This is captured by
function name : U → I that maps each user with his real identity.
Every user is also associated with a set of pseudonyms. Pseudonyms are
mostly temporary identifiers that facilitate identification and authentication of
a user in a communication without revealing the user ’s real identity. MAC ad-
dresses of wireless devices, IP addresses, public keys, group signatures, physical
layer fingerprints of wireless devices, signature of the applications, and the com-
bination of these identities are different examples of pseudonyms. The user to
whom a particular pseudonym refers is called the holder of the pseudonym. If it is
shared by multiple users, a pseudonym is called a group pseudonym. Based on the
information derived from a pseudonym per se, no one (except the pseudonym’s
holder) can identify the holder of the pseudonym [61]. Let Î denote the set of
pseudonyms used by all the users. The set of real identities and pseudonyms
are disjoint, i.e., Î ∩ I = ∅. We define function nyms : U → P(Î) that gives
the set of pseudonyms associated with each user, where P(Î) is the power set
of Î. A user can use various pseudonyms over time. Pseudonyms can expire or
be revoked from the network. Lastly, we define Î(t) ⊆ Î to denote the set of
pseudonyms that are still valid at time t.
42.2 Time and Space
The notion of time that we employ in this model is discrete, and each unit of
time, which is a natural number, is called a time instance. We define a time
period (ts, te) to be the set of all time instances between ts and te including ts
and te. Let T be the time period in which we model the system.
We employ a three-layer model in order to represent the space in which users
can move, and its associated contextual information. The first layer models the
geographical space. The second layer models the places or location sites, and the
third layer models the type of sites.
We model the first layer, i.e., the geographical space in which users can move,
in a discrete way. Let L ⊂ N2 be the grid that represents the two dimensional
space. We name any member of the set L a location instance. We also call a non-
empty set of location instances a location area. Each location instance belongs to
a location site that has a unique name and address (e.g., a hospital, an avenue, or
a house with its unique ZIP code). In other words, any location instance has a tag
name, and clearly, multiple location instances can have the same name because
they belong to the same site. The location sites, which are constructed on top
of the location instances, build the second layer of the model. The third layer
captures the type of location sites and their similarity. A location type represents
the usage of the location, e.g., shopping, cultural, sporting, residential.
Note that the granularity of time and location depends on the application
and we do not make any assumption about that.
2.3 The Spatiotemporal State of Users
As users are mobile, their location is a time-dependent value. To model the users
mobility, let whereis : U ×T → L be a function that gives the actual location of
users at any time instance in T . Note that this function gives the exact location
of each user, regardless of the knowledge of any entity about it (i.e., maybe even
the user himself does not know his accurate position, because of, for example,
the inaccuracy of his GPS device).
We model a mobile network in terms of the location-based events that occur
in the network. Events in our framework reflect the spatiotemporal state of the
users in the real world and also in the eyes of an observer.
We define an event as a 3-tuple 〈i, t, l〉, where i ∈ I∪Î is the real identity or a
pseudonym of a user, t is the time instance at which the event occurs (referred to
as the time-stamp of the event), and l ∈ P(L) is the location area associated with
the event (referred to as the location-stamp of the event). Let E denote the set
of all possible events. We define three functions id : E → I ∪ Î, tm : E → P(T ),
and loc : E → P(L) that give the identity, time-stamp, and location-stamp of an
event, respectively. Thus, for any event e ≡ 〈i, t, l〉 we have id(e) = i, tm(e) = t,
and loc(e) = l. We further define a trace to be a non-empty set of events.
An event e is called an actual event associated with a user u if the following
conditions hold: id(e) = name(u), loc(e) = whereis(u, tm(e)), and tm(e) ∈ T .
Thus, an actual event represents the spatiotemporal status of a user in the real
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the trace of all his actual events. Let Ru denote the trajectory of a user during
T . Hence, Ru = {〈name(u), t, {whereis(u, t)}〉,∀t ∈ T }.
We define relation ∼ between two actual events ei and ej , if and only if they
are associated with the same user, i.e., ei ∼ ej ⇔ ∃u ∈ U s.t. ei, ej ∈ Ru. Let R
denote the set of all actual events of all users. Thus, R = ⋃uRu, and ∀u, v ∈ U
we have Ru ∩Rv = ∅. Hence, the relation ∼ partitions the trace R into subsets,
each representing the actual trajectory of one user. We refer to the set partition
associated with ∼ as the actual set partition of R.
3 Location-Privacy Preserving Mechanisms
Actual events represent the state of the real world, i.e., the actual locations of
users over time. A user has absolutely no location privacy if an adversary has
access to the set of his actual events. To protect a user’s location privacy, some
privacy preserving mechanisms should alter the information observable by the
adversary. Ideally, the amount of information leakage should be minimal, while
enabling users a proper use of the service. There are three entities that play a
role in preserving location privacy: users, applications, and privacy tools. Each
entity controls the amount of shared information and thus affects user privacy.
Users and applications might intentionally (e.g., by being cautious about sharing
unnecessary information) or unintentionally (e.g., by sharing incorrect informa-
tion) reduce the amount of information revealed. Privacy policies influence the
way applications can share information with different entities, and they are ap-
plied to the application based on the users’ decisions. Various privacy tools, also,
use sophisticated algorithms to guarantee users’ privacy.
In order to capture the effect of the three above-mentioned entities in preserv-
ing location privacy of users, in our framework, we abstract away the entities and
model a location-privacy preserving mechanism as a single unit that separates
actual events of the users (i.e., the ground truth) and the adversary. Formally
we define a location-privacy preserving mechanism as a transformation function
that modifies the users’ actual events before they can become observable by any
observer.
Privacy tools (as the main entity in location-privacy preserving mechanisms)
work in three architectures: (i) Distributed (user-side): They can work in a dis-
tributed way by being implemented on individual mobile devices, where each
device itself transforms its events and modifies what an observer can see about
the user’s spatiotemporal state. This can be done either with the help of infor-
mation that a device gets from other devices or exclusively with the information
that the user has himself. (ii) Centralized (server-side): They can work in a cen-
tralized manner by using a trusted central server that acts as a privacy preserving
proxy and modifies users’ messages (correspond to events in our model) before
being observable by an untrusted entity. (iii) Hybrid : They can be a hybrid of
both distributed and centralized architectures.
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Fig. 1. Location Privacy Preserving Mechanisms
We define function trns : E → E ∪ {hidden} to denote the location pri-
vacy preserving mechanisms, where hidden stands for a hidden event (i.e., an
unobservable event). The output events of the transformation function on the
set of actual events is called the set of observable events and is denoted by R̂,
i.e., R̂ = −−→trns(R) \ {hidden}, where −−→trns() is the image of function trns()
on a trace. Mechanisms perform the transformation function by means of four
different methods (which can also be called the primitives of location-privacy
preserving mechanisms): hiding events, adding dummy events, obfuscation, and
anonymization. These four methods together can model any transformation on
the events: the first two (hiding events, and adding dummy events) modify the set
of the events, obfuscation modifies time- and location-stamps, and anonymiza-
tion modifies identity of events. Figure 1 illustrates the role of different entities
that can employ a combination of these methods in order to alter the accessible
information to an observer. The methods are described below.
– Hiding Events The most basic method for protecting users’ location pri-
vacy consists in hiding information about the trajectories of users. A subset
of events are removed in the transformation process. This is modeled by
replacing the candidate events by hidden in the trns function, which will
not further appear in R̂. This method is implemented mostly in distributed
architectures where mobile devices refrain from transmitting information by
being silent during certain time periods. Privacy sensitive users, or privacy
tools (e.g., [10, 44, 45, 47, 53]) make use of mainly this method (along with
other method). It can also be implemented in the centralized architecture.
A service provider who follows some privacy policies, in practice, is apply-
ing this method. The mechanisms proposed in [40, 42] are examples of using
event-hiding privacy tools, especially, in centralized architecture.
– Adding Dummy Events The other method to achieve privacy is to mis-
lead an observer by adding some dummy events through the event injection
method of the transformation function. This method can be effectively im-
plemented in the centralized architecture. Mechanisms proposed in [19, 49,
51, 55, 71] employ mainly this method. Generating a trace of events that
looks like a normal user’s trajectory is one of the main challenges of this set
of papers.
7– Obfuscation Using this method, the location-stamp and/or the time-stamp
of the actual events in R can be altered. Obfuscation methods result in
inaccuracy or imprecision of the location/time of the events [26]. This is done
by adding noise to the location- and/or time-stamp of the events or by coarse
graining them. The method can be implemented in both distributed and
centralized (and hence the hybrid) architectures using various algorithms. In
the existing privacy preserving mechanisms, obfuscation is achieved mostly
through perturbation [38, 56] or generalization [7, 8, 18, 35, 38] algorithms.
– Anonymization Using the anonymization method, the identity of an event
in R is altered in order to break the link between a user and his events or to
make a user’s events unlinkable to each other. To this end, in the transfor-
mation function, the real identity of a user on each event can be replaced by
one of his valid pseudonyms. In the centralized architecture, this method is
implemented mainly by replacing all the events’ identities with a single group
pseudonym (full anonymization by having no identity, i.e., null pseudonym
[66]), e.g., Cornielius et al. [21]. In distributed architectures, users themselves
change their pseudonyms from time to time. This pseudonym change is done
usually in some predetermined places called mix zones (Beresford and Sta-
jano [10]) where users remain silent when they are inside the mix zone and
change their pseudonyms when they leave the zone. Thus, these mechanisms
employ the hiding method as well, e.g., Jiang et al. [47]. The pseudonym
change can also be done in a self-organized way by using group-signatures
(e.g., Calandriello et al. [16]) or ring-signatures (e.g., Freudiger et al. [32])
as group pseudonyms. The mechanism proposed by Li et al. [53] also makes
use of group pseudonyms, and users exchange their group pseudonyms with
each other when they leave mix zones. Buttyan et al. [15] and Freudiger et
al. [31, 30] proposed formal models to evaluate the effectiveness of static and
dynamic mix zones, respectively, (users decide on-the-fly whether to change
their pseudonyms or not) in mobile ad hoc networks.
We denote the observable trace of a user u ∈ U , which is the output of
the location privacy preserving mechanism applied on the user’s actual trace, by
R̂u = −−→trns(Ru). Thus, R̂ =
⋃
u R̂u. If two actual events ei and ej are associated
with the same user (i.e., ei ∼ ej) and eˆi = trns(ei) and eˆj = trns(ej), then
we define a relation ∼o between eˆi and eˆj . In other words, we define eˆi ∼o eˆj if
eˆi, eˆj ∈ R̂u for some u ∈ U , which represents the linkability of observable events.
4 Threat Model
Depending on the characteristics of the mobile network and the services pro-
vided for users, location privacy of users can be threatened in different ways.
The adversary can be an entity who eavesdrops on wireless communications be-
tween users, or she can be the operator who provides a location-based service for
her subscribers, or even she can be one of the users in the network who partic-
ipates with other users in running a protocol. In our framework, the adversary
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Fig. 2. Structure of the threat model and adversary’s attributes
is actually the entity who observes the output of privacy preserving mechanisms
and, hence, has access to a subset of the observable events R̂. The subset of
R̂ that is accessible to a given adversary is called the set of observed events by
that adversary and is denoted by R̂o ⊆ R̂. The properties of this subset and
the implication of this observation on the users’ location privacy depend on the
characteristics of the adversary. Note that the adversary might have multiple
observation points from each of which she can observe a different set of events.
At each observation point, the adversary, observes different transformations of
the same actual events. However, the structure of transformations (not their
settings) is the same. Thus, in this section, we focus on the set of adversary’s
observed events at a single observation point, which is shown by R̂.
In this framework, we model an adversary based on the following three fac-
tors: her Means, Actions, and Goals. Each of these factors are explained in the
following sections and illustrated in Figure 2.
4.1 Means
The means of the adversary are the technologies available to her for capturing
events, her access credentials in the system, and her a priori knowledge about
the system.
Access — The adversary might eavesdrop on the wireless communication of
users. Based on the level of sophistication of her eavesdropping devices, the ac-
curacy of observed events changes. It can also be the entity in the organization
that provides the service for users. For example, the adversary might be the
insurance company who periodically collects positions of vehicles in a Pay-As-
You-Drive application [68], or can be the operator of an automatic toll collection
system who can get more sparse information about location of vehicles. Finger-
printing wireless devices [14, 22, 29] is also one technique that can be used in
order to extract pseudonyms correlated to the hardware used by a user rather
than based on the content of his messages (e.g., IP address). As another example,
the adversary might have access to the high-level transactions of a location-based
9service (LBS) or an environment monitoring network [39].
Knowledge — The a priori knowledge of the adversary is composed of multiple
pieces. Here, we categorize the adversary’s knowledge into multiple classes. The
precision and confidence of the adversary’s knowledge about each class deter-
mines her a priori knowledge. Her knowledge in each class can be deterministic
or probabilistic and this must be clarified in each threat model.
– Users The adversary might know the (exact or estimated) number of users
at any time, or more precisely the set of users U , that implies knowing the
real identity of active users. This knowledge can evolve over time, or she
may remain oblivious about the dynamics of the set of users and their join-
ing/leaving. This class of adversary’s knowledge also includes the adversary’s
knowledge about the relation between users, i.e., social network graph.
– Identities This class specifies to what extent the adversary knows about
the users’ identities and the pseudonyms used by them. The adversary might
know the relation between pseudonyms of a user, and also the constraints on
the set of pseudonyms (e.g., how many pseudonyms a user can have). The
extent to which each pseudonym is linkable to its holder’s real-identity is
also part of the knowledge of the adversary in this class.
– Space The knowledge of the adversary on the three-level model for the space
in which users move falls into this class. The connection between users and
places must also be specified here. For example, does the adversary know
the address of the users’ homes or their workplaces, which are modeled in
the second layer of our space model?
– Events The adversary might have access to some actual events that are per-
formed before the observation time. Moreover, in many cases the adversary
has some statistics about the typical behavior of users. For example, she
knows the (im)possibility or the probability that one specific actual event
can be performed by a user, or that two specific events belong to the same
user. Knowledge of the adversary about mobility profile of users (which rep-
resents how probable/possible it is for a specific user or a mass of users to
move from one location to another location in a specific time period) falls
into this class.
We assume that the adversary knows the application, employed privacy tools,
and also the location-privacy metric that users (or system designers) use.
4.2 Actions
The adversary might be passive and only observe the network, or, in addition to
that, become active and interact with the users in order to obtain more infor-
mation about them. In most of the cases in the literature, the adversary is only
a passive observer. However, one can imagine some sophisticated active attacks,
such as the following ones. By relaying [60] the traffic between two different mix
zones [10], the adversary can create a fake high-density area and encourage neigh-
boring users to change their pseudonyms. Thus, users have an erroneous feeling
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of high privacy while the adversary can easily distinguish between pseudonyms
in each mix zone and link the users’ pseudonyms. The adversary can also cre-
ate fake toll readers in vehicular networks by using a relay attack and force
users to reveal their presence in critical locations. Here, the adversary actively
participates in asking users to generate some events.
The action scope of an adversary is determined by the size of the location
areas and the duration of time periods in which the adversary observes the
system. Considering these factors, adversaries can consequently be divided into
different categories. An adversary is global if she observes the observable events
occurred at any location in the space. Whereas, she is called local if during the
observation period she cannot observe the transformation of some events that
are generated in specific location areas. Similarly, based on the observation time,
an adversary is referred to as a short-term attacker if the transformation of events
performed at some time periods are not observable by the adversary. In the case
there is no such time restrictions, she is called a long-term attacker. In the case
an attack is global and long-term, we have R̂o = R̂.
4.3 Goals
Presence vs. Absence Disclosure — An adversary’s goals of observing users’
activities in a mobile network can be divided into two main categories: presence
disclosure or absence disclosure. In the former category, the adversary’s goal is to
find out if a given user or a set of users are present at some place(s). Whereas, in
the latter category, the adversary wants to know whether a specific set of users
are not present at some place(s). Virtually all of the attacks presented in the
literature fall into the first category. However, there are some reports about the
consequences of absence disclosure attacks on people. As an obvious example,
by misusing her access to an LBS database, the adversary can find out the best
time to break into a person’s house, or blackmail them. An implementation of
this attack can be found here [6]. Obfuscating the victim’s location as big as
the whole North America cannot protect him from absence disclosure attacks if
he lives in Europe, despite the fact that the adversary cannot locate his exact
location. However, using that obfuscation, if the user lives in the US, his location
privacy is protected against both presence and absence disclosure attacks.
Individual vs. Mass Target — The attacks can disclose the private informa-
tion of a specific user in an individual target attack, or it might be targeting a
set of users, collectively, in a mass target attack where the adversary does not
distinguish users in the set, for example when they belong to a community.
Tracking vs. Identification — The two main known attacks on users’ location
privacy, which are used usually to disclose users’ presence, are tracking and
identification. These two attacks are tightly related to each other, although they
have different ways of obtaining users’ private location information.
In tracking attacks, the adversary’s goal is to reconstruct the users’ actual
trajectories (which might have been distorted by privacy preserving mechanisms)
and subsequently identify the locations that the users have visited. This infor-
mation can be used to predict the future locations of users. The tracking can
11
be done in various manners depending on the adversary’s goal. The adversary
might want to know the trace of location instances (i.e., coordinates) visited by
the users in a given time period, or the location sites (e.g., specific hospital)
where they have been to, or only the type of places that the users are used to
periodically visit.
In identification attacks, the adversary wants to discover the real identity of
her targets. This can be done on small scale where the adversary is interested
in de-anonymizing a specific observed event, or on a large scale where the ad-
versary is interested in finding the identity of users from whom the adversary
has observed some anonymous traces of events. The identification is done using
some inference attacks based on the adversary’s knowledge on the linkability
of the users to sensitive areas such as their homes or work places [37, 41, 50].
Identification can also leverage on the mobility pattern of users, because users
tend to visit certain places regularly [23]. It can also be done indirectly through
de-anonymizing [58] the social network that is linked (e.g., friend-finder applica-
tions) to the users’ observed events.
It is clear that the success of each of the two above-mentioned attacks also
paves the way for the other. In the case the adversary manages to discover the
actual trajectory of a user, the identification of the user is not a difficult task.
Especially if the adversary has access to the information about location sites
such as homes or work places of the users, which contain a lot of information
about their identities. In the case that the adversary has already de-anonymized
some events of a user, the recovery of the user’s actual trajectory (i.e., tracking
him) can be done more easily, if the adversary has access to the mobility profile
of the users.
Tracking and identification attacks have been individually studied in the lit-
erature. However, there is not much research done on modeling the inter-relation
between them, which the adversary is likely to make use of (a combined attack).
Considering that many privacy preserving mechanisms focus on protecting users
from one of these two attacks, it is of upmost importance to analyze to what
extent the adversary can break the privacy of users by running unexpected at-
tacks, e.g., de-anonymizing the traces using the social network graph available
to the adversary. Lastly, some inference attacks can be developed in order to
recognize the activities of the targets and track the types of places they visit
(which may eventually leads to their identification) [54].
5 Location-Privacy Measurement
Every location-privacy preserving mechanism is designed based on an assumed
location-privacy metric. In the literature, various metrics have been used to cap-
ture location privacy in different scenarios. Needless to say, choosing the right
metric for each specific setting is of upmost importance to increase the actual
users’ location-privacy against possible attacks. Considering different users’ pri-
vacy needs, we define location privacy on macro and micro levels. We define the
notion of macroscopic location privacy to be a user’s privacy level throughout
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his trajectory, whereas the microscopic location privacy is defined to represent
a user’s privacy on a small scale, for example at the time an event related to a
given user is observed. These two metrics are tightly related to each other, and
reflect location privacy in two different scales. The selection of the right scale
highly depends on the threat model and on the specification of location-privacy
requirements. Using these notions, we classify the metrics that have been used so
far, and thus we can discuss their effectiveness in representing the true privacy
level of users.
Microscopic Location-Privacy We expect the location privacy of a user at
the micro level, depending on the user’s privacy requirements, to be inversely
proportional to the success of the adversary in identifying his real identity when
an event is observed of a user, or to locate the user at a given time instance
and find out his presence/absence at a given location. The more accurately the
adversary can locate a user, the poorer the location privacy of the user will be.
Depending on the threat model, the adversary might be interested to find out
the coordinate of the user’s location, his location site, or the type of his location.
The most popular metric for this micro location privacy is based on the un-
certainty of the adversary. This metric was originally proposed by Diaz et al.
[25] and Serjantov and Danezis [65] for anonymous networks (known as entropy-
based or information theoretic-based metrics), and by Samarati and Sweeney
[63, 67] for database privacy (known as k-anonymity metric, where, assuming
maximum uncertainty for the adversary, k is equal to the effective anonymity
set size [65]). These metrics were adapted to measure microscopic location pri-
vacy by Gruteser and Grunwald [38], and later used in many papers such as [7,
12, 34, 35, 48, 57, 64, 70, 72]. Virtually all of the various versions of uncertainty-
based metrics for micro location-privacy, measure only the adversary’s success in
the presence-disclosure identification attacks. The metric reflects a given user’s
privacy, from whom an event is observed by the adversary, as the size of the
effective anonymity set in which the user is hidden.
Macroscopic Location-Privacy How accurately the adversary can track a
user throughout his trajectory (i.e., tracking attack), or how closely she can
find out the identity of a user after observing a set of events (i.e., identification
attack), is reflected by macroscopic location privacy metrics. The set of macro
metrics can be divided into two main categories, based on the set of the criteria
that is used in each metric: uncertainty -based and error -based metrics.
— The first set of macro metrics reflects the uncertainty of the adversary in
tracking users. Similarly to the micro metrics, in this category, entropy-based
metrics and k-anonymity are the two most popular measures. The set of observed
events are linked to each other, based on the a priori knowledge of the adversary,
in a way that each link shows the possibility and also probability of observing
the two linked events from the same user. The entropy-based metrics exploit
this data structure and compute the adversary’s uncertainty at the outgoing
links of each observed event. These values reflect the user’s privacy throughout
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his trajectory, however, only at the time instances that an event is observed of
the user. The overall privacy level is measured mainly as the fraction of times
when the uncertainty is below a threshold [9, 10, 30, 40, 42, 44, 45, 47, 53]. The k-
anonymity metric is extended also to the macro level by measuring how many
trajectories at a time period are indistinguishable in an anonymity set [12, 36,
59, 69].
— The second set of macro metrics are based on the adversary’s error in track-
ing/identifying users. This category is divided into multiple subclasses: (i) clustering-
error, (ii) probability of error, and (iii) distortion-based metrics.
(i) Clustering-error metrics: The adversary’s goal is defined to be the clustering
of the observed events into partitions, based on the relation ∼o, each partition
for one user. Formally, the adversary is looking for R̂u for all u ∈ R. Two slightly
different versions of this metric are used in [28, 39]. Note that both versions aim
at measuring the success of adversary’s tracking attack.
(ii) Probability of error metrics: The adversary’s probability of error in finding
the real identity of a user, or linking his observed events, is considered as the
metric. For identification attacks, in [50] various algorithms using machine learn-
ing techniques are proposed to identify the homes of mobile users in the users’
observed events and subsequently find their identities based on the adversary’s
knowledge. Similarly, in [41] an algorithm is proposed to identify users based on
their home addresses. The higher the average adversary’s probability of error is,
the higher the users’ location privacy is in their model. In [33] the probability of
error is used as the metric to evaluate users’ location privacy against tracking
attacks in mix zones.
(iii) Distortion-based metrics: Having prior knowledge about the system, and af-
ter observing a set of events, the goal of the adversary of perpetrating the track-
ing attack is to reconstruct the actual trajectory of the users. The distortion-
based metric [66] reflects how distorted the reconstructed trajectory of each user
will be for the adversary. To measure the distortion, it is enough to condition the
possible actual trajectories of the targets to the observed events, and compute
the expected distance of the predicted location of a user with his actual location
at any time instance. It is shown that this metric is superior to the other macro
metrics that focus on tracking attacks, in terms of the accuracy of the metric.
A set of criteria, derived from the definition of location privacy, is also proposed
to compare the effectiveness of the metrics.
Here, we discuss the next steps towards the definition of more accurate and
realistic location-privacy metrics. The departure point is the threat model. Con-
cerning presence disclosure attacks, we need metrics that represent users’ loca-
tion privacy in the presence of identification/tracking attacks. In identification
attacks, uncertainty-based metrics (when we are measuring the system level pri-
vacy) and metrics based on the adversary’s probability of error (when we measure
user level privacy) are more representative of users’ location privacy. Regarding
tracking attacks, distortion-based metrics are shown [66] to be more accurate
than other metrics, as the adversary’s goal is to predict as closely as possible the
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users’ actual locations over time, and the more distorted her prediction is the
higher users’ location privacy is.
6 Related Work
In this section, we briefly survey the papers that formalize location privacy or
give an overview of location-privacy problem.
Hong and Landay [43] introduce a basic toolkit, called Confab, for devel-
oping privacy-sensitive ubiquitous computing applications. The requirements of
end-users (e.g., decentralized control, special exceptions for emergencies, and
plausible deniability) and also application developers needs (e.g., support for
optimistic and pessimistic applications, access control mechanisms, and logging)
are considered.
As an important technique to protect users’ location privacy in LBSs, Duck-
ham and Kulik [26] propose a formal model for obfuscation mechanisms. The
authors provide an algorithm to balance each user’s desired quality of service
against their need for location-privacy.
Bettini et al. [11] model the microscopic location-privacy of users in location-
based services. The authors take a few different kinds of knowledge the adversary
could acquire, and evaluate users’ privacy using uncertainty-based metrics.
Decker [24] gives an overview of location-privacy problems in LBSs and di-
vides them into two main classes: direct and indirect attacks. Furthermore, the
technical approaches to prevent misuse of location data are classified in the fol-
lowing categories: policy approaches, anonymization, and deliberate impairment
of locating. The role of legal regulations in protecting users’ location privacy is
also discussed.
Blumberg and Eckersley [13] present a list of emerging threats and oppor-
tunities of location-aware services that create digital repositories of people’s
movement and activities. As a way to protect people’s location privacy in the
short run, the authors refer to “using cryptographic tools” for building systems
that blindly provide location-based services and cannot infer information about
people’s location. The authors believe that, in the long run, “the decision about
when we retain our location privacy (and the limited circumstances under which
we will surrender it) should be set by democratic action and lawmaking.”
Krumm [52] provides a literature review of computational location privacy.
The authors discuss the need for sharing location information and also the value
that people put on preserving location privacy. Going through a list of threats
and countermeasures, the author, state that the progress in computational loca-
tion privacy is dependent to the accuracy of location privacy metrics.
Shokri et al. [66] propose a framework for modeling and evaluating macro-
scopic location-privacy metrics. Within this framework, they formalize various
metrics and, based on a set of criteria derived from the definition of location
privacy, the authors study the effectiveness of existing metrics in reflecting the
actual users’ location privacy. Finally, they propose a distortion-based metric
and show that it is superior to other existing macro metrics.
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As discussed, all these works focus on formalizing a specific problem of loca-
tion privacy, e.g., particular protection mechanisms, and therefore do not provide
a generic framework that encompasses all location-privacy components.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a framework for location privacy that unifies its rel-
evant components, considering users’ actual location-privacy requirements. We
identify different categories of threats, and establish a methodology for mea-
suring location privacy in different scenarios in order to identify appropriate
location-privacy metrics. The proposed framework enables us to design and build
appropriate location-privacy protection mechanisms, identify the drawbacks of
existing works, express different works with the same terminology, and discover
new directions for research in location privacy.
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